Qe8(fork), Kb7; QxB

So he got a strategically lost position (in his own estimation) after nine moves on purpose? And if tactical complications were all he needed, why did Tal lose so decisively to the same opponent a year later?

Amazing the nonsense people will believe. Yes, I have Tal's match book. No, it doesn't say Tal made bad moves on purpose.

Here's Yermolinsky' sensible comment on the Tal-Botvinnik matches and the nonsense that has been written about them:

<It was a golden age of chess journalism with all those writings about 'an ultimate clash' between 'iron logic', represented by Botvinnik, and 'diabolical tactical trickery', as shown by Tal. It appealed well to the generally well-educated masses of chess fans in the Soviet Union, who needed a little poetic flavour - describing a chess game as an intellectual duel - to keep fuelling their interest in sparsely played World Championship Matches between Soviet grandmasters. Their sympathies were more or less evenly spread between the two players. Even some 15 years later, the Botvinnik-Tal controversy didn't seem to be dying out. Indeed, it represented a mystery: the first match saw Botvinnik losing by 4 points, and the next year he came back, winning by an even larger margin. Serious books had been written on the subject, with in-depth analysis of the players' respective styles done by the best chess journalists the Soviet Union ever produced.

I considered myself a good enough chess-player to form my own opinion on the subject. Surely I wasn't going to take any crap from sportswriters, and one day I sat down to look at the games myself. Luckily, the books also contained the game scores from both matches. I thought of something along the lines of tracking the widely announced differences between the players' styles. I expected to see wild attacks and numerous sacrifices from Tal in one game, and deep strategic plans relentlessly implemented by Botvinnik in another. Before I could do any deep analysis I was disappointed. The difference in style didn't show as much as I expected!

Tal, the tactician, was well aware of the positional principles listed in the books. Botvinnik, the strategist, went for tactical solutions very often. The two bashed at each other any way they could, with Tal winning the most in the first match, and Botvinnik getting the better of it in the return match. I couldn't see where the difference between them lay, except for Tal being the aggressor early and more often. Go figure. I began to suspect that I, along with thousands of others, had been led to believe in something that didn't exist.

Position after 15.Qd2

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Botvinnik: <Tempting Black into the line 15...Bxh4 16.Rxh4 Qxh4 17.Bg5 Qh2 18.Qb4. When you are playing Tal, looking at such lines is just a waste of time. Even if objectively poor, these lines would favor him subjectively. Black therefore chooses the prosaic transfer of the knight to a strong position at f5.>

Dvoretsky: <The World Champion's logic is understandable, but not indisputable. Such players as Viktor Korchnoi and Lev Polugaevsky – outstanding calculators themselves – did not believe Tal's calculations, tested them, and sometimes found mistakes, which they then successfully exploited. Not accidentally, both players had terrific plus scores against him.>

Tal: <Curious variations might arise after 15...Bxh4. White could then play either 16. Bh6, threatening Bf1-h3-g4, with a more pleasant position than the one he gets in the game (one of his weaknesses has disappeared, in any case); or he could decide upon the very sharp 16.Rxh4 Qxh4 17.Bg5 Qh2 [Dvoretsky: on 17...Nxe5?, Tal gives 18.Bxh4 Nxf3+ 19.Ke2 Nxd2 20.Kxd2, with active White pieces; but instead White just wins by 18.de! Qxa4 19.b3)] 18.Qb4 f6 19.Qxb7 Rb8 (19...0-0 20.Bh6) 20.Qxc6 fg, and now not 21.Qxe6+ Kd8 22.Nc5 Nhf6!, as given by Tigran Petrosian, but the immediate 21.Nc5! 0-0 22. Nxd7, with a very sharp game, perhaps not unfavorable to White.>

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Tal: <Black can't get his queen back in time, since the a7-pawn is loose. On 31...Kb7, White sacrifices his bishop by 32.Bxb5 cb 33.Qxb5+ Kc7 (or 33...Ka8 34.Qc6+ draws) 34.Bd2, and White's threats have suddenly become too dangerous. [Dvoretsky: Well, not *too* dangerous: after 34...Qxe5 (and a few other moves as well), White still has to give perpetual check.]

After 31...Kb8, the bishop sacrifice no longer works, since Black can meet 32.Bxb5 with the intermediate move 32...Bd8. 32.Bxf5, intending to answer 32...gf with 33.Be3, doesn't work either: Black refutes the attack by 32...Qh1+ 33.Ka2 Qxf3 34.Be3 d4! 35.Bxd4 Qd5+, maintaining great winning chances.

However, White could first insert the moves 32.a4 b4, and now, 33.Bxf5 would be very strong: on 33...Qh1+ 34.Ka2 Qxf3 35.Be3 d4 36.Bxd4, the d5 square is now controlled by White's queen. [There follows some analysis of 32…Qh1+ instead of b4 in this line] One may conclude that White’s attack is quite sufficient to draw.>

Botvinnik: <Here, Black would have won by 31...Kb8 32.Bxf5 (32.Bxb5 Bd8) 32...Qh1+ 33.Ka2 Qxf3 34.Be3 d4 (35.Bxd4 Qd5+). Unfortunately, I missed the move 34...d4 in time-pressure (it was pointed out later by Petrosian).

True, Tal later tried to show that White still obtains a draw by playing 32.a4, instead of 32.Bxf5. But, without trying to cast doubt on the multiplicity of complex variations he presented, we note that Black can avoid all this sophistry, and just force a favorable endgame by 32...Qd8! 33.Qxd8+ (33.Qa6 Qb6) 33...Bxd8 34.ab Nd4 35.bc Nxf3, with threats of 36...Bc7 and 36...Nd4.>

Dvoretsky: <Nevertheless, White did have a clear path to the draw, which went unnoticed by the grandmasters. After 31...Kb8!? 32.Bxf5! Qh1+ 33.Ka2 Qxf3, White must play, not 34.Be3?, but 34.Bd2!!, and when Black takes the bishop with his pawn, 35.Bb4!, with perpetual check (and if he takes the bishop with the queen, 35.Be3!).>

5.gxf3

"The annotators unanimously condemned this move. The argument is not whether a chess player employs an absolutely untried opening subtlety, not knowing even one theoretical variation. It is probable that any popular chess book will tell you that similar pawn doublings are disadvantageous in that one must not weaken the kingside so early in the opening, etc., etc. In this case, it seems to me, in spite of the purely psychological pluses (an absolutely new position completely devoid of any possibility that Black might have done any home "grinding") the move 5 gxf3 has some positional basis: first of all it strengthens White's center, and second of all it opens the g-file along which he might be able to create pressure in the future. If Black immediately tries to refute this move and plays the straightforward 5...e5, then the following factor comes into effect: in the open game the strength of the pair of Bishops especially the light-squared one (not having an opponent) sharply increases . . . Botvinnik, correctly evaluating the position, decided to give the game a closed character. In the normal course of a game this would lead to approximately equal chances."

He played 8.h4 anticipating 'gambit play' with 9.a3 Bxc3+ 10.bxc3 dxe4 11.fxe4 Nxe4 12.Qf3 Qa5 13.Rh3 N7f6 14.h5 0-0-0 15.h6 gxh6 16.Be5 Ng5 17.Qxf6 Nxh3 18.Kd2 Ng5 19.Bd3 but felt 'a cold shiver go down his spine' with 19.....Qxe5 killing white's initiative. As Dvoretsky writes, "this is typical Tal: a long and completely unnecessary variation".....since black has several different ways of preserving an advantage (15.....g5 and 18.....Nxf2).

Tal is generally very complimentary about how Botvinnik played the middle game, but thinks Botvinnik could have secured his advantage with 27.....Bc5 followed by .....Rd7 and with 27.....Rf8 he begins to get passive.

Tal writes that he badly wanted to sacrifice his rook with 30.Rxf7 Qe8 31.Qa5 Qxf7 32.Qxa7 threatening 33.a4 but rejected it because of 32.....Rh7 33.a4 Bd8 34.Qa8+ Kd7 35.axb5 Ke8 36.bxc6 Qa7

Tal doesn't say it exactly but he seems to think it's a lucky break that white has such a sudden and strong attack after 31.Qa5.

3.gxf3 did not me make shudder. I went with Tal's reasoning right away. Also knowing an active Rook early doors can wallop an opponents active minor piece. If you can out number the minor pieces in the early part of the game then good things can happen.

As Tal admits the doubled f-pawn did not fit well with 9.e5 and Botvinnik hit on the drawback of the double pawn (the f5 square) with the maneuver g6 Ng7 and Nf5.

Tal said he nearly spent the rest of his available time here...

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...on 37.Ba6+ Kxa6 38.Qc6+ Ka5 39.c3. (He spent 7 minutes rejecting it. )

Black can stop the mate by pinning the b2 pawn (39...Qe2) and then Black can take the perpetual. But having pulled this game out of the fire he decided not '...to tempt fate.' which hints he saw the move 39...Qe2 but was not too sure with the clock ticking very close to move 40 if he still had the perpetual. (tempting fate) Else I think he may have gone that way.

The gist of Tal's pre-game and in-game notes suggest he would use moves and openings that might upset Botvinnik. (Tal calls this being 'mischievous.')

Not reckless moves but take him on in openings where Botvinnik felt safe and if given the choice go for double-edged activity where Tal felt he was the stronger player. This can backfire as Botvinnik was no slouch if it got messy but Tal thrived on dog dinner positions and Botvinnik, if given the choice, tended to avoid them.