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| Nov-20-04 | | kostich in time: this was Fischer first win with the 'poisoned pawn", in a variation which was seen, at the time,as better for White. Bg5! improves on Duckstien-Euwe, 1958 |
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Apr-01-06
 | | OBIT: What is remarkable about this game is that Bilek lost on time while Fischer played the entire game in under 10 minutes! Apparently, this game never left his home analysis. This was not Fischer's first game with the Poisoned Pawn; for example, there is also
Parma vs Fischer, 1961. However, I think kostich is correct that it is Fischer's first win with the variation. |
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| Apr-01-06 | | Jim Bartle: I can only imagine what Bilek was thinking, then: "I'm winning, I'm crushing him. But he looks so calm, and he's moving too fast..." |
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| Apr-01-06 | | technical draw: 1962 was the year Bilek was awarded the GM title. And here is how the great Fischer toys with a "lesser" GM. |
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| Apr-14-06 | | IMDONE4: I'm suprised that Fischer would play black's side of the poisoned pawn variation. He always highly valued the initiative, and was a master of positional play. e6 also seems and unseemly choice for Fischer for those reasons. |
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Apr-15-06
| | OBIT: To be sure, Fischer was a positional player, but he was also partial to sharp variations, especially with Black. As Alexander Shashin described Fischer, "he divided himself into 'White Fischer' and 'Black Fischer.' With the white pieces, Bobby pretended to be the greatest classical player, playing dry and precise chess, often draining his opponents in 60-move endgames. The Black Fischer, because of a pathological greed for points, strove for ultra sharp play in Korchnoi's manner." As for whether the Poison Pawn is justified positionally, well, it DOES win a pawn, at least temporarily, and it DOES leave White with two isolated pawns. If White cannot develop enough initiative to compensate for these weaknesses, he is bound to wind up in a losing position. Yes, beginner's books always give dire warnings on the fallacy of grabbing a knight pawn with the queen, but, as with most blanket statements, this is nonsense - the pawn grab has to be evaluated on a case by case basis. He who grabs a pawn and runs away generally has a won endgame. |
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| Apr-16-06 | | IMDONE4: Never thought of Fischer as much of a defender :) |
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| Nov-13-08 | | zev22407: To IMDONE another cool defense in the same variation by Fischer is Tringov-Fischer 1965 |
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| Mar-09-09 | | jaimdelg: To the question: Why does Black expose his queen so early in the Poison Pawn Variation? Precisely, that’s why it’s called the “poisoned pawnâ€. Here, White offers a pawn sacrifice and in exchange White will keep the black queen trapped and “out of the game†for several moves while White hopes to devastate Black’s position before Black can bring its queen back into the game. On the other side, Black is willing to take the “poisoned†pawn hoping to defend well and try to bring its queen back to the fight as soon as possible. In other words, if Black decides to “eat†the poisoned pawn and then can bring its queen back to the game, Black in effect “neutralizes†the poison without any harm, but if Black “eats†the poisoned pawn and then White doesn’t allow him to bring its queen back to the battle on time, then Black has been “poisoned†by the pawn that he took. This variation is not for everyone, who instead could choose not to take the pawn. I’ve seen many times how White allows the black queen back into action too soon, only to see himself now down a pawn, and with the game in the verge of the endgame. |
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| Mar-09-09 | | jaimdelg: It is as important how much time you have in the clock (managing time) as well as how good you are calculating. Fischer very rarely took more than 5 minutes thinking a move, so his opponent couldn't have Fischer's own time to think by himself. It's unbelievable how many of Fisher's opponents lost a game at the end (the 5th hour) by getting into time trouble 'cause of the aforementioned, or 'cause of Fischer's complications, or both. |
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| May-29-09 | | Eyal: This is the second game in which Fischer employed the "Poisoned Pawn" variation, and the first in a series of games in which he introduced several important novelties, especially to the 10.e5/12.Bc4 line, that played a major role in rehabilitating it for Black during the 60s. Here, by 14...Bxg5, he was improving on 14...fxe6 from A Dueckstein vs Euwe, 1958. In later games he introduced 12...Bb4 (Tringov vs Fischer, 1965) and 12...Qa5 (G Mazzoni vs Fischer, 1967). After 15.Qxg5, <15...h6!> is a key move – besides creating a retreat square for the black king, which is important in certain lines, it forces the white queen to give up the ideal g5 square, where it keeps an eye on g7, e5 and e7 (denying it from the black queen) - so that 15...Qxc3?? 16.Nf5 or 15...fxe6?? Nxe6 would lose instantly. The best move for White is considered to be <16.Qh5!> where after 16...fxe6 (16...Qxc3? 17.Rxf7) 17.Nxe6 he should gain an advantage, e.g. in case of 17...Rxf1+ 18.Rf1 Qe7 19.Qf5! or 17...Qxc3 18.Nxf8 Nxf8 19.Qf7+ Kh7 20.Qxf8; Kasparov supplies a lengthy analysis of the latter line in OMGP 4. But of course it was very difficult for Bilek to figure all this out during the game... <22.Nf3> is accurate – instead, 22.Qh4? would lose to 22...Qe3+ 23.Qf2 (23.Kf1 Nc6 24.Rxa8 Nxd4) 23...Qc1+ 24.Qf1 Qxf1+ 25.Kxf1 Nc6 26.Rxa8 Nxd4; note that the interpolation of the check on c1 is necessary, since after 23...Qxf2+ 24.Kxf2 Nc6 25.Rxa8 Nxd4 White would win a piece by 26.Rd8, whereas with the white king on a light square 27.Rd8 runs into 27...Bb5+. As Kasparov points out, on moves 25-27 Bilek missed several good chances for a draw with <h3!>. The idea is that by creating luft for the king, White threatens to activate the knight via f3 so it could join the attack on the black king, and it seems that Black would have to give back material in order to finally activate his own pieces. For example, 25.h3 Bc6 26.Nf3 Nd7 (26...Bxf3?? 27.Qe8+ Kg5 28.Rxf3) 27.Qxa8 Nxf8 28.Qxf8; or 26.h3 Be6 (26...Bc6?? 27.Qd3+ Kf7 28.Qc4+, or 27...Qf5 28.Rxg7+) 27.Qd6 Qf7 28.Rf8! Qd7 29.Qb6! Kh7 30.Qb1+ g6 31.Rf6 Bf5 (31...Qe8 32.Qxb7+ Nd7 33.Rxe6) 32.Qb3 Kg7 33.e6! Bxe6 34.Rxe6 Nc6 35.Rd6! Qf7 (35...Qxd6 36.Qxb7+ Ne7 37.Qxa8) 36.Qxf7+ Kxf7 37.Rd7+ Ke6 38.Rxb7. Maybe even in the final position White isn't lost, if he corrects his 27th move and plays 28.Rf8. But at any rate, the fact (mentioned in a previous post) that Bilek flagged while Fischer hardly used his own time is a tribute to the incredible depth of Fischer's home analysis. |
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| Apr-17-11 | | Corndog2: After 12.Bc4, doesn't 12...Bb4 give black a slight advantage? Isn't this the line that is played more commonly nowadays? To me, black's position is more attractive, and I don't know if white has compensation for his pawn.
Example Line: 12...Bb4 13.Rb3,Qa5 14.0-0, 0-0 15.Bf6, Nxf6 16.exf6, Rd8, where I think black is slightly better. |
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| Dec-13-11 | | King Death: <Corndog2>, here's a famous game with 15.Bf6: R Byrne vs Larry Evans, 1965. |
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| Sep-03-12 | | Luigi Bros: For black I think:
12. Bc4 Bb4 13. Rb3 Qa5, and great predicament for the white, because the the central pawn no have defense, and queen no can leave the position, because the knight is stuck. In any situation, Fischer won a piece. |
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| Nov-06-14 | | andrewjsacks: A game like this, and others in which Fischer played this line, seems to defy the notion, expressed by Geller and others, that Fischer's one weakness was in "irrational" positions. |
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| Nov-06-14 | | Tim Delaney: White's attack is spent, and there is nothing left to do. It's the chess equivalent of rope-a-dope. The Black rook appears to be imprisoned, but in reality is ideally positioned behind a remote passed pawn. White's e pawn cannot advance, and Black easily controls the white squares on the king side. |
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| Nov-06-14 | | kevin86: While white has virtually zero moves, black can advance his pawns with alacrity and white can't do thing one about it. |
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Nov-06-14
 | | FSR: Tringov vs Fischer, 1965 is another example of ruthlessly accurate defense by Fischer in the Poisoned Pawn. He had a great record with it. http://www.chessgames.com/perl/ches... |
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| Nov-06-14 | | RookFile: Openings like this show that Fischer was decades ahead of some of his opponents. |
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| Nov-06-14 | | Peter Nemenyi: It's really not plausible that Fischer played this whole game in ten minutes on his clock, since that would imply that even at the end he was following his home analysis rather than calculating. Soltis says that Bobby "took less than 10 minutes to achieve a winning position" but used thirty-five minutes in all, which is far more believable. |
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| Nov-06-14 | | thegoodanarchist: < IMDONE4: Never thought of Fischer as much of a defender :)> When you are the best player in the world for half of your career you don't hone your defensive technique as much as other, lesser players do. As a lesser player, I speak from experience :) |
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Nov-06-14
 | | HeMateMe: He wasn't better than Spassky. He ducked Spassky for years until entering the '70 world championship cycle. Bob was the best player in the world for three years, beginning in '72. That much we know. |
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| Nov-06-14 | | AnMN7: Surely One Man's Meat is Another Man's Poison |
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| Nov-07-14 | | Peter Nemenyi: <HeMateMe: He ducked Spassky for years until entering the '70 world championship cycle.> What basis do you have for this claim? Given how international tournaments and the Soviet chess system worked during Fischer's career, he could only have faced Spassky regularly before their match by being a Soviet citizen. The record tells us that Fischer played at Mar del Plata twice, the second time in 1960 when Spassky was present, then never showed interest in that tournament again. Of the two Piatigorsky Cups, rare all-grandmaster tournaments held on American soil, he boycotted the one Spassky missed (1963) and played in the one Spassky attended (1966). Then at the 1970 Siegen Olympiad, by which time he'd become so erratic and demanding that it seemed unlikely he'd ever play team chess again, he joined the American team and faced Spassky, although the organizers had rejected twenty-four of his by-then-typical twenty-five stipulations. So not only was Bobby not ducking Spassky, the evidence could even be taken to suggest that he regarded Spassky's presence in a tournament as an incentive to play in it. |
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Nov-07-14
| | HeMateMe: <What basis do you have for this claim?> Chess history, in the 1960s. Spassky was the one guy that Fischer could not beat. That doesn't mean he couldn't win a match against Spassky, but as Fischer got more and more paranoid, he could not enter a cycle in which spassky would likely be a match opponent, in the final or otherwise. That's how I read it. You are free to draw your own conclusions. |
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