As Kasparov points out, on moves 25-27 Bilek missed several good chances for a draw with <h3!>. The idea is that by creating luft for the king, White threatens to activate the knight via f3 so it could join the attack on the black king, and it seems that Black would have to give back material in order to finally activate his own pieces. For example, 25.h3 Bc6 26.Nf3 Nd7 (26...Bxf3?? 27.Qe8+ Kg5 28.Rxf3) 27.Qxa8 Nxf8 28.Qxf8; or 26.h3 Be6 (26...Bc6?? 27.Qd3+ Kf7 28.Qc4+, or 27...Qf5 28.Rxg7+) 27.Qd6 Qf7 28.Rf8! Qd7 29.Qb6! Kh7 30.Qb1+ g6 31.Rf6 Bf5 (31...Qe8 32.Qxb7+ Nd7 33.Rxe6) 32.Qb3 Kg7 33.e6! Bxe6 34.Rxe6 Nc6 35.Rd6! Qf7 (35...Qxd6 36.Qxb7+ Ne7 37.Qxa8) 36.Qxf7+ Kxf7 37.Rd7+ Ke6 38.Rxb7. Maybe even in the final position White isn't lost, if he corrects his 27th move and plays 28.Rf8. But at any rate, the fact (mentioned in a previous post) that Bilek flagged while Fischer hardly used his own time is a tribute to the incredible depth of Fischer's home analysis.

12. Bc4 Bb4 13. Rb3 Qa5, and great predicament for the white, because the the central pawn no have defense, and queen no can leave the position, because the knight is stuck. In any situation, Fischer won a piece.

The Black rook appears to be imprisoned, but in reality is ideally positioned behind a remote passed pawn. White's e pawn cannot advance, and Black easily controls the white squares on the king side.

As a lesser player, I speak from experience :)

The record tells us that Fischer played at Mar del Plata twice, the second time in 1960 when Spassky was present, then never showed interest in that tournament again. Of the two Piatigorsky Cups, rare all-grandmaster tournaments held on American soil, he boycotted the one Spassky missed (1963) and played in the one Spassky attended (1966). Then at the 1970 Siegen Olympiad, by which time he'd become so erratic and demanding that it seemed unlikely he'd ever play team chess again, he joined the American team and faced Spassky, although the organizers had rejected twenty-four of his by-then-typical twenty-five stipulations. So not only was Bobby not ducking Spassky, the evidence could even be taken to suggest that he regarded Spassky's presence in a tournament as an incentive to play in it.

Chess history, in the 1960s. Spassky was the one guy that Fischer could not beat. That doesn't mean he couldn't win a match against Spassky, but as Fischer got more and more paranoid, he could not enter a cycle in which spassky would likely be a match opponent, in the final or otherwise. That's how I read it. You are free to draw your own conclusions.

It is a wonder that he continued to play at all.

Their second Exchange Gruenfeld, and a hell of a game. Fischer did get the advantage, but again grabbed a hot pawn and got completely outplayed by Spassky from that point. Reminiscent of their first game.

You know draws don't count.

Again, the answer is no. He got a big advantage in the first game; he never had an advantage in the second game; and he had a small advantage in a very complex position in the third game.

Fischer was the world number 1 for half his career. If you don't know that it just means you are ignorant, not that your post is correct.

Don't I know it.

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