<Move 19 White> - Steinitz says that he might, perhaps, have pressed the attack with more prospects of success at move 19 by <19. f4> Qxe4 20. Bd3 followed by Bxh7, whilst Gunsberg further notes that his reply of <19...Rd8> was made in anticipation of <20. f4>, which could then be parried by <20...Qf6>; Steinitz says that the movement of <20...Qd6> at this point would be followed by <21.R(a)d1> when Black dare not take the B, on account of <22. Bc1>, but would win nevertheless, by <21...Bg4>

<Move 22 Black> - Gunsberg draws attention to the favourable position of his B after move 22, as it prevents White playing <23. Bb2> He considers that White might have secured a better attack with <22. f4> than with the move actually made, and remarks that <24... Be5> would have been bad for Black on account of <25. g4>, which would win a piece. Steinitz considers the move of <24. ..c6> was very good

The first game of the match between Gunsberg and Steinitz was conducted by the two players with a considerable show of caution, and Steinitz admits that an attacking player would have acted differently from what he did , whilst Gunsberg remarked that he was convinced that Steinitz would not have consented to a draw had he possessed the black men at the finish. Before proceeding boldly,however, Gunsberg desired to know more about the play of his antagonist. General hopes are expressed that the competitors will show more dash in the conduct of their future games.

<Move 4 white> - The two players agree in describing White's forth move <f3> as entirely new at that stage. Mr Steinitz adopted it with a view to forming a centre, and the taking advantage of the confined position of the adverse QB.

Gunsberg remarks it will be seen the move enable White to utilise his N to fortify his centre, by bringing it to <f2> via <h3>. Steinitz considers the reply <4...Nc6> as probably the best way to stop the advance in the centre, although, as Gunsberg points out , his advice in close openings is not to develop this <Nc6> opening before the <c> pawn has been moved. Black's reason for playing the move was to force White to advance <e3>, a course necessary to prevent the loss of a pawn by <dxc4>.

<Move 5 White> - Steinitz points out that <5.e4> would have led to a good game for Black by <5...dxe4> 6.d5 exd5 7. cxd5 Ne5

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and regards his own move of <6.Nh3> as providing a better outlet for the N later on than if it stood at <e2>, for this latter plan would have necessitated him playing <Bd3> , whereupon the piece could have been attacked by <Nb4>

<Move 9 Black> - Gunsberg considers that by the properly prepared move of <9...e5> Black assumes the initiative , preventing his opponent from establishing a strong centre, and finally breaking up his Queen's wing.

<Move 11 White> - Instead of the move actually made, Steinitz says he would have done better by

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<11. Nd3> Bxc3 12. bxc3 Re8 13. cxd5 Nxd5 (or Qxd5) 14. e4.

Gunsberg points out that <12. Nd3> would have been met by <12...Bxc3>, and he remarks that he possessed the better position for the end game after making his thirteenth move, whilst the retirement of the R to <e8> placed it in a safer position, and rendered it more useful than if stationed elsewhere.