| Mar-17-08 | | Knight13: Something wrong with 22. Rfd1 ? Maybe even 22. Rcd1 ? |
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| Mar-17-08 | | guaguanco: 22...Ne2+ is threatened. |
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| Mar-17-08 | | Knight13: <guaguanco: 22...Ne2+ is threatened.> Thanks. (I miss this kind of move in OTB I'm quitting chess) |
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Oct-25-09
 | | wwall: After 21...Nf4, not 22.Bxf4 exf4 23.Qxf4? Bg5, pinning the Queen and Rook and winning the exchange. Also, 22.Bxf4 exf4 23.Qf3 Ne5 24.Qe2 f3. |
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Oct-25-09
 | | Pawn and Two: In the tournament book Golombek recommended 14.d4, indicating advantage for White after either 14...exd4 or 14...b5. Fritz agrees 14.d4 is in White's favor, but indicates 14...Nb6 as Black's best reply: (.57) (21 ply) 14...Nb6 15.Bxc6 Qxc6 16.b3 0-0 17.d5 Qd7 18.Ne3 Bg5 19.0-0. Fritz prefers the move 14.Nb4: (.78) (21 ply) 14...0-0 15.0-0 b5 16.Nxc6 Qxc6 17.cxb5 axb5 18.Bb3 Nb6, and White can maintain his advantage with 19.Rfc1 Qd7 20.Rc2. The final position was approximately equal after either: 24...Ne7 25.Bxf4 Exf4 26.Qxf4, or 24...axb5 25.cxb5 Ne7 26.Bxf4 exf4 27.Qxf4. After the move 24.b5, Reshevsky offered a draw, which was quickly accepted by Keres. Reshevsky later told Golombek that he was very short on time (his clock read 2 hours 8 minutes, leaving a little over 1 minute per move to reach time control at move 40) and that he did not wish to risk anything at this comparatively early stage of the tournament. |
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| Oct-25-09 | | AnalyzeThis: I think Reshevsky knew what he was doing and was wise to take the draw. |
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Apr-20-23
 | | KEG: Kmoch/Horowitz in their book on the 1948 World Championship Tournament call this game the "first 'grandmaster' draw of the tourney." In fact, it was nothing of the sort. Keres and Reshevsky battled for 24 moves until they were both getting short of time in a complicated position that is hard to evaluate. The decision by both players to half the point was entirely reasonable and plainly prudent. It also spared Keres and Reshevsky from a protracted game that most likely would have been drawn when both were scheduled to play the tournament leading Botvinnik in their next game (Reshevsky in Round 9 and Keres--after his 9th-round bye--in Round 10). With the benefit of hindsight, we all now see that Keres got crushed by Botvinnik in their upcoming game while the Reshevsky--Botvinnik 9th round game ended in perpetual check after 34 moves after the former missed possible winning chances. Without a crystal ball, however, Keres and Reshevsky had no way of knowing this. The above being said,those of playing over the game today, 76 years later, cannot help being disappointed at the sudden termination of hostilities. The first cycle of games (Rounds 1 through 5) featured uncompromising struggles with only two of the ten games (both involving Smyslov) ending in draws. Here in the second cycle (Rounds 6-10), pretty much the opposite was the case with seven of the ten games being drawn. There are many possible explanations for this. For one, the players may all have been tired after their Herculean efforts in the first cycle. Botvinnik (who yielded only one draw in Cycle 1), may have been happy to maintain and even slightly expand his lead over the field by drawing three of his four games. On the other end of the standings, Euwe, who had lost all four of his games in the previous cycle, may have been satisfied to pick up 1.5 points from three draws. As for Keres, Reshevsky, and Botvinnik (all of whom at this point had realistic chances of overcoming Botvinnik), they may have been willing to keep their powder dry. In any case, the game at hand was engrossing contest for as long as it lasted. 1. e4 e5
2. Nf3 Nc6
3. Bb5
The fifth Ruy Lopez out of the 16 games played in the first eight rounds of this tournament. 3... a6
4. Ba4 d6
As Keres aptly noted in his commentary on this game, Reshevsky usually played 4...Nf6 at this stage of his career, but he had gotten a poor position in this line against Smyslov in the first round and decided to engage Keres in another variation of the Ruy (i.e., a deferred version of the Steinitz Defense). Reshevsky was also, as pointed out by Horowitz using Keres' own weapons against him; Keres having defeated Euwe with 4...Nd6 in Round 1. Euwe had played on of the usual lines against 4...d6 in that game (5. c3). Keres had other ideas here playing White against Reshevsky: 5. c4
click for larger viewThis move previously championed by Duras by this time was a Keres favorite. It involves a major trade-off: it helps restrain d5 or b5 by Black, but at a price (the weakening of d4 as noted by Euwe). Keres mentioned that in this World Championship tournament the oft played 5. BxN+ was never employed. 5... Bg4
The most aggressive counter to Keres' 5. c4. Horowitz condemned the text as "practically commit[ing] Black to an exchange of Bishop for Knight." Euwe retorted that this minor piece exchange further weakened White's control of d4. This observation notwithstanding, Keres called the move "unsuccessful" because Black remains unable to use d4 and therefore recommended 5...Bd7 (the usual alternative to 5...Bg4 here). The most salient observation concerning 5...Bg4 was that of Golombek, who pointed out Keres' smashing victory against the mighty Alekhine at Margate 1937 (misidentified as "Margate 1939 by Golombek) when the later tried 5...Bd7. Keres was indeed well-versed in the nuances of 5...Bd7. In addition to his 1937 win against Alekine, Keres also thrashed Thomas after 5...Bd7 at Hastings 1937-1938, and drew a hard-fought game against Capablanca at the 1939 Olympiad in Buenos Aires after 5...Bd7, and beat Sokolsky in this line at Moscow 1947. Reshevsky thus quite reasonable chose 5...Bg4 here, a move which in any event more closely matched his style. 6. Nc3
click for larger view6...Nf6 is here the usual move for Black. But Reshevsky had a surprise here for Keres. |
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Apr-21-23
| | KEG: Post II
6... Nge7
click for larger viewA novelty at the time, and only sporadically played since. Whether this was, as Keres opined, part of a system of development Reshevsky had prepared to develop his g8 Knight through e7 (en route to g6) or a way of getting Keres (an opening maven) out of lines he knew well is difficult to guess. 6...Nf6 looks natural, but the text is far from any kind of mistake. 7. h3
"!"--(Horowitz)
7... BxN
Maintaining two Bishops with 7...Bd7 was perhaps better, but the text made it easier for Reshevsky to develop his pieces. And 7...Bh5, as Euwe pointed out, "would have abandoned the strategic idea of move 5." 8. QxB
click for larger view8... Ng6
The downside of this move, as noted by Euwe, is that the Knight will soon have to return to e7. But that, as Euwe continued, does not mean the move was wrong. Bronstein recommended 8...Nc8, but then Keres' proposed 9. Qg4 will yield a difficult position for Black. 9. Nd5
"!"--(Keres)
Keres recalled that he had previously tried 9. d3 here against Sokolsky in 1947, but Black then played played Be7 and Bg5 and obtained "an adequate position." Here against Reshevsky, he tried for more. The text as Horowitz pointed out, threatened Nb4 and an assault on the Black Queen-side. This left:
[bad FEN: r2qkb1r/1pp2ppp/p1np2n2/3Np3/B1P1P3/5Q1P/PP1P1PP1/R1B1K2R] 9... Rb8
Intending b5 (Golombek)(Horowitz)(Euwe)(Keres). Keres praised this subtle defensive move by Reshevsky. 10. Nb4
This looks plainly best. By contrast, 10. b4 discussed by most of the commentators, would not have given White anything tangible with best play: e.g., 10...b5 11. cxb5 axb5 12. Qc3 Nd4 ["!"--Keres, Euwe and not 12...Qd7 which leads to trouble for Black after Golombek's 13. Bd1! (much stronger than Keres' proposed 13. Bb3)] 13. Nxc7+ [this piece sacrifice is not great, but there is nothing better for White] Kd7 14. Nxb5 NxN 15. Qc4 [Probably best, though 15. BxN followed by 16 a4 leaving White two strong connected passed pawns for the sacrificed piece looks tempting] Qb6 [forced] 16. Qxf7+. The commentators disagreed about the merits of White's position here after the Knight sacrifice; Golombek liking White's chances [perhaps because he here had Black continue with the inferior 16...Ne7 instead of Keres' much better 16...Be7]. Golombek notwithstanding, it is hard to disagree with Euwe's assessment that "it is very doubtful whether White has sufficient compensation for the sacrificed piece or Keres' conclusion that the likely coming complications "are favorable only for Black." In sum. the text (10. Nb4, which gives White an obvious edge) was almost certainly best. It left the position as: 
click for larger view10... Nge7
Played, according to Golombek, after a half-hour's thought. Keres said that this retreat showed that Reshevsky had mishandled the opening. In fact, Reshevsky would have been better placed with 10...Qd7. Golombek said this would allow White to win a pawn, but his line was badly flawed: 11. BxN [inferior to 11. NxN--see below] bxB 12. Nxa6? [Chances would be about even with 12. Nc2] Rb6 13. Qa3 [13. Nxc7+ was not much better] and now not 13...d5? as given by Golombek but 13...Qc8! winning. White can indeed obtain a modest edge after 10...Qd7 with Euwe's 11. NxN bxN followed by 12. b3. After Reshevsky's likely inferior 10...Nge7, the position was: 
click for larger view |
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Apr-21-23
| | KEG: Post III
11. Nc2
Though this is one way of preparing for d4, Keres called it "an irrational method of exploiting the advantage obtained in the opening." That leads to the obvious question: What IS the best course forward here? (A) Most of the contemporary commentators agreed that 11. d4 was inaccurate because of 11...b5. Even here, White retains some advantage. The text, however, is better than that. (B) Keres thought 11. d3 was "very strong," and Euwe called it a "good possibility." Golombek disagreed, claiming that 11. d3 led only to "equality" for White. Let's see. Black has two plausible replies: 11...b5 and 11..Qd7. Keres said that 11...b5 (a move now considered by Golombek) is best for Black. Play might then continue. 12. NxN NxN 13. cxb5 axb5 14. Bb3 Qd7 15. Be3 and now, instead of Keres' suggested 15...Nd4, which leads to a near winning edge for White despite the Bishops of opposite colors after 16. BxN exB 17. 0-0 Black can maintain decent chances with 15...Na4, though White remains better after 16. 0-0 NxB 17. axN because of his much better development and his command of the a-file. Euwe, however, claimed that 11...Qd7 was better, and Golombek claimed that Black can now equalize after 12. Be3 b5 13. NxN NxN 14. cxb5 axb5 15. Bb3 with 15...Nd4. But thi, as above, gives White something close to a winning game after 16. BxN exB 17. 0-0. Black can avoid this with 15...Na4, getting a playable though inferior game. In sum, White maintains his edge with 11. d3, but Black would remain in the game with either 11...b5 or 11...Qd7, which transpose into the same position and are equally reasonable responses. So is 11. d3 best? Is there something better.
(C) 11. Qb3. None of the contemporary commentators mentioned this possibility. It seems at least as strong as 11. d3: e.g., 11...Qd7 12. Nd5 Ng6 13, d3 Keres' move also seems perfectly reasonable to me. It left: 
click for larger view11... Qd7
As Golombek and Keres pointed out, 11...b5 would have been a mistake in light of 12. cxb5 axb5 13. Bb3 f6 and now, instead of Golombek's 14. Be6 which allows Black chances with 14...d5, White would obtain a strong grip on the position with either 14. a4 or 14. 0-0-0. Keres suggested 11...Nc8 but White would respond--not 12. b4 as given by Keres--but 12. d4 with an impressive center and a clear edge. So Reshevsky's 11...Qd7 looks best. While White retains some advantage, the bigger problem for Sammy was his clock, since he had used 56 minutes for his first eleven moves. 12. d3
"?"--(Keres)
Keres, who thought he should have gotten more from the position, engaged in considerable over-the-top self-flagellation in his commentary on this game. The text was unquestionably reasonable and allowed White to retain his small but definite advantage. Keres (and Golombek with him) was here affected by Bronstein's claim that White could here play 12. b4. But the analysis of 12. b4 by Keres and Bronstein assumes that Black would play 12...Nc8, but the simple 12...Ng6 leaves Black reasonably placed. I am with Horowitz here, who praised the text as allowing the White Bishops to prove their superiority to Black's Knights and as eventually allowing for d4 by White. All of the commentators trashed 12. d4. But that really wasn't bad at all. Keres' suggestion that this would be refuted by 12...b5 looks clearly wrong: 13. cxb5 axb5 14. Bb3 Ng6 looks excellent for White if he now plays 15. d5 (rather than Keres' 15. Be3). Golombek's 12...exd4 would be better than 12...b5, but even there White retains the advantage: 13. Nxd4 b5 14. NxN NxN 15. cxb5 axb5 16. Bb3 Nd4. This is Golombek's line, but I fail to see how he can claim that Black has here attained "equality." For whatever reason, all of the contemporary commentators ignore 12. 0-0, which was at least as good as the text and likewise allows White to retain some advantage. After 12. d3, the position was:
click for larger view12... Nc8
"With this move Black primarily threatens to exchange the bishop with 13...Nb6 followed by Na5." (Keres). But this threat is easily addressed by White, and the seemingly obvious 12...Ng6 was perhaps best. |
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Apr-21-23
| | KEG: Post IV
After 12...Nc8, the position was:
click for larger view13. Bd2
None of the contemporary commentators liked this move, but it seems the easiest refutation of 12...Nc8 since it precludes Black's intended 13...Nb6 and 14...Na5 to trade of the White a4 Bishop. Keres, Euwe, and Horowitz all preferred 13. b4. But after 13...Be7 14. Bb3 (Keres' idea) 14...0-0 or 14..b5 or even 14...Bf6 Black seems OK. Somewhat better in this line were 14. Bd2 or 14. 0-0, but even then White has a smaller edge than with 13. Bd2. Golombek contended that White does better with 13. BxN, but Black then plays 13...bxB rather than Golombek's 13...QxB which can indeed lead to some trouble for Black. 13... Be7
Keres' suggested 13...Nb6 does look like an improvement (and now if 14. BxN then 14...bxB). After 13...Be7, the position was certainly in White's favor: 
click for larger viewBut how now should White (Keres) proceed:
14. Qg3
Bronstein and Golombek said that 14. d4 was stronger. But Black seems basically OK with Golombek's own 14...b5 15. cxb5 and now---instead of Golombek's 15...Nxd4 Black should play 15...axb5 16. Bb3 0-0. Keres' 14...Nb6 (also championed on this site by <Pawn and Two> would be no improvement after 15. BxN QxB 16. b3. Keres' actual move, which prepares for a later f4, looks better than 14. d4. <Pawn and Two> reports that Fritz prefers 14. Nb4, but 14...b5 seems a more than satisfactory reply. If there is an improvement for White here, it probably lies in 14. Qg4 Nf6 15, Nb4. But even with this Black's position is likely defensible. 14... Bf6
click for larger view15. Rc1
"?"--(Keres)
"...plagued by the sin of over-refinement..." (Golombek) "A move whose purpose is difficult to explain." (Keres) Oh come on, Paul. Your move here may or may not be absolutely best, but it hardly was any sort of blunder. Horowitz called the text "mysterious," but then noted that it was "designed to anticipate Black's contemplated b5...Then the Rook will operate on a open file." Very likely, 15. b4 as given by most of the contemporary commentators might have been better, but Black then would have had reasonable play with, e.g., 15..N8e7. 15... Nb6
"!"--(Keres)
While I see the logic in the text, wasn't this the time for Reshevsky to derail White with 15...b5. After 15...Nb6, the position was:
click for larger viewPerhaps of most importance, the clocks as reported by Horowitz now showed: Keres: 1:22
Reshevsky: 1:34
This position, as it turned out, was Keres' last chance to retain a significant edge: 16. Bb3
"?"--(Keres)
Here I agree with Keres. The best line--and the best chance for White to try for a win--was 16. BxN bxB 17. b3. But, as Keres failed to mention, even with 16. BxN, White is a long way from victory. 16... Qd8
"!"--(Keres)
"To vacate d7 to permit the Knight to maneuver Nd7-c5." (Horowitz)(see Keres similarly) This left:
click for larger viewReshevsky had escaped the worst and the position was now approximately even. |
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Apr-22-23
| | KEG: Post V
The fact that chances were about equal did not mean the position was drawish or easy. On the contrary. I would have expected Keres or Reshevsky to defeat most other tournament players from either the White or Black position here. But now they were each paired against another giant of the chessboard. 17. 0-0
Finally somebody castled!
17... Nd7
Preparing Nc5 and bringing a potential later b5 into the picture. 18. a3
"To safeguard the Bishop against...Nc5." (Horowitz) Golombek suggested 18. f4 (as did Bronstein) but, as pointed out by Keres, after 18. f4 exf4 19. Qxf4 Nc5 would be problematic for White. White could, of course, improve with 19. Bxf4, but even then Black would have the initiative with 19...Nc5. The text was thus unquestionably superior to 18. f4. But Keres, always ready to trash his play in this game, found an improvement: 18. Ba4, "correcting the previous mistakes..." 18... Nc5
click for larger view19. Ba2
Practically forced, since 19. Na1 looks wretched. 19... 0-0
20. b4
Finally!
20... Ne6
click for larger view21. Be3
"Overlooking Black' threat; otherwise he would have played 21. Rb1." (Golombek) "With 21. Rb1 White could have prevented the liquidation that now follows." (Euwe) Sorry guys, but 21. Rb1 was no real improvement, though the sequence that follows would not have been possible had the White Rook on c1 been on b1 where the potential Rook/Queen skewer exploited by Reshevsky on his next move would not have been a possibility. 21... Nf4
"!"--(Golombek)(Horowitz)(Euwe)(Keres)
21...Ncd4? would, as pointed out by Keres, allow White to obtain serious chances with 22. NxN NxN 23. BxN exB 24. c5. After Reshevsky's far superior 21...Nf4, the position was: 
click for larger viewA very difficult position to evaluate...and to play. |
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Apr-22-23
| | KEG: Post VI
22. Qf3
Keres was still trying, but as he said in his commentary, this (temporary) pawn-sacrifice failed to secure any advantage for him. As all of the commentators noted, If here 22. BxN exB White could not play 23. Qxf4 because of the 23...Bg5 skewer. If instead 23. Qf3 in this line, then White lands in some trouble after 23...Ne5 24. Qd1 c5 (much better than Golombek's 24...f3. As <gquguanco> has pointed out here, White also has to prevent 22...Ne2+ winning his Queen. 22... Nxd3
click for larger viewSo Reshevsky has nabbed a pawn. But there is no decent way for him to maintain this fleeting material advantage. Of more significance was the time trouble as given by Horowitz: Keres: 1:51
Reshevsky: 1:55
23. Rb1
"Preventing the Knight's escape via b2 and preparing to shut it in by 24. b3." (Golombek) 23... Nf4
This returns the pawn but, as the commentators all remarked, Black had nothing better. 24. b5
Reshevsky's clock revealed his severe time trouble with 17 move left for him to make before reaching the move-40 time control: Reshevsky: 2:08.
The position was now:
click for larger viewIn this exciting position, Keres and Reshevsky agreed to split the point. This is of course disappointing, since watching Keres square off against Reshevsky was always a thrill. As a prudent sporting decision by two players in the midst of a long hard tournament, the decision is entirely understandable. They both had Botvinnik up next, albeit after a fairly long break (this Round 8 was played on March 18; Round 9--in which Reshevsky would play Botvinnik--was not played until March 23 five days later, and Keres' next game--in Round 10 versus Botvinnik--was set for March 25). After that round, the players would travel to Moscow where the final three round robins would be played. One can quibble about whether Reshevsky (and especially Keres) needed any kind of a break at this point. But World Championship play is a thing apart in top level chess, and any chance to rest was always welcome. Both players were plus 1 at this point, and were evidently loathe to put more than necessary on the line at this stage of the tournament. |
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Kibitzing
