Well the story isn't really about preparation.
More like a lack of it.

11...d5 was part of a "secret weapon" by the
Russians to set Fischer on his heels in
Game 1 of the match.

Remember that he had just won 2 matches 6-0,6-0.
This was their last chance to stop Fischer and
avoid Spassky going thru the Fischer cuisnart.

So the real story is:

1) In spite of the brilliant opening innovation
the Russians still had a loss for their troubles.

2) Petrosian had little to do with the move.
(it wasn't the result of his burning the midnight oil) Which was why he handled it so poorly at the board.

3) While Fischer sat across the board from Taimanov,
Petrosian, Spassky. He didn't really play individuals. He faced more of a machine.

Individual match-ups are different than slogging through candidates matches and tourneys. This is why Korchnoi and Stein may cause more problems for certain players than former and current champions. Kamsky's record and play against Kramnik is a modern example of this. Adams vs. Kramnik is another.

What's interesting is that, as you point out, the "machine" was cumbersome and not of much help, ultimately. Case in point, Petrosian received this prep, but it was not his own, and he flubbed it. It makes me wonder if Petrosian had any say as to who would exactly be his immediate assistants. Did he still have Koblentz to work with?

As far as Spassky goes, it seems he had already stopped listening to Bondarevsky, the man who almost single-handedly dragged Spassky to victory in '69.

When I've perused "Fischer vs the Russians" book (I think that's the title) everyone had incorrect opinions of Fischer's play, Fischer's weaknesses and Fischer's predilictions. Only Korchnoi realized that Fischer may mix things up in the opening vs Spassky, and saw the American more clearly. Korchnoi was not taken seriously (most of all by Spassky), and I imagine he wasn't used as a second for the reigning champion.

Fischer was amazing, distilling all the Russian chess magazine material over the years, while fashioning himself into a monster of a chess player. It's quite possible, if he found a solid second that he actually had some kinship with, he may not had to wait until '72 for the title. As it played out, Fischer was only able to keep his powerful will and focus together for long enough to run the table from '70-'72.

Fischer is not in fact the only guy who ever faced a novelty and didn't lose. You're trying to make this into the Marshall Gambit story, but it isn't.

The problem here wasn't in preparation, Petrosian just lost nerve at a critical moment. They'd had the move for months (it was sent to the Central Club in an envelope marked "To the winner of the Petrosian-Korchnoi match").

They'd analyzed the position up through Move 16, and planned to play 16...Rxg2 in that position. Then when the moment came, Petrosian simply didn't play it. He admitted it, but didn't really give a good explanation about why he didn't. I'd assume though, that it was a combination of respect for Fischer, and lack of trust in his seconds (Seutin and Averbakh, as I recall). He must have been afraid that Fischer would find something that they missed. The lesson in it all is to stick to the game plan unless you have a good reason for deviating. He didn't have one.

but he was in fact the only one to go 6-0, in
a candidates match leading up to this.

He was in fact the only one to go 6-0 a second time.

He was in fact the only one to take 1st place in the
Palma interzonal to qualify for these matches.

He was in fact the only one to defeat Petrosian in the remaining games of this match.

He was in fact the only one to go on and defeat Spassky for the world championship title in 1972.

He was in fact the only American to win the World Chess Championship.

That's what your missing.

Oh ok, So Fischer and Petrosian bumped into each other at the beach and decided to have this match?
(maybe at the local Dairy Queen?)

Bobby said: Hey Tigran.
Tigran said: Hey Bobby, want to play some chess.
Bobby said: Sure, but lets make these some unimportant off hand games. I may win. After all people have won
chess games before we wouldn’t want to give me too
much credit.

<as long as one great claim about him is true, then anything good about him is true.>

So this wasn’t true?

“but he was in fact the only one to go 6-0, in
a candidates match leading up to this.
He was in fact the only one to go 6-0 a second time. He was in fact the only one to take 1st place in the Palma interzonal to qualify for these matches.
He was in fact the only one to defeat Petrosian in the remaining games of this match. He was in fact the only one to go on and defeat Spassky for the world championship title in 1972. He was in fact the only American to win the World Chess Championship.”

Wow, I guess you “caught” me in a lie.

<But you've got to realize that there are also some people actually interested in his chess.>

Where?
I think what you mean is interested in chess pre 1970 and post 1972. I think what you mean is interested in moves like 8.Ba5 from 1962. I think what you mean is interested in Fischer losses not Fischer wins.

I now view Bobby Fischer as the ultimate X-File. I understand your skepticism at RJFs sainthood. Algore is seen as a "prophet." More like profit.

I have always maintained that RJFs defeat of The Soviet Machine in the early 70s was one of the most amazing things, ever. But then we have Karpov, Kasparov and now, apparently, Anand!

But Marshall was known as a "bombs away" player who disliked any kind of "grind it out" chess.

Petrosian, on the other hand, loved a good grind it out game - it was sort of his style. He also had another factor to inhibit playing the novelty:

But despite the loss, the innovation was quite good. After Spassky shut Tal down with White with that line in their Candidates final, he joked about wanting to erect a statue to Frank Marshall.

This innovation was more playable, and seems to have shut down the line for White altogether (the Marshall attack didn't put the Ruy Lopez out of business). I've always meant to check and see if anyone had ever reached the position and actually played 16...Rxg2, but haven't gotten around to doing it.

Even though he was worse in the adjourned position, he claimed that his seconds didn't help him analyze enough, or that their adjournment analysis wasn't strong enough to help him save the draw

This innovation was more playable...>

It came up in only one game (its not in this database)

Matijasevic-Baric, corr Yugoslavia 1972

It continued 16...Rxg2 17. Qe3 Nd4 18. Kf1 Nxc2 19. Qf3 Rxf2+ 20. Kxf2 Qc5+ 21. Ke2 Qxc4+ 0-1

But if this is the only game played with this line, and this is why it went out of favor, I think it needs more testing

For example at first sight, it looks like instead of 19. Qf3, 19. Qd3 is better (if not winning) for white...Black has two pieces hanging

I'm just curious if any other games have been played with 16...Rxg2 (or any other move) that definitively put this line out of business

Sometimes lines are considered 'unsound' because of reputation, rather than hard proof...That's why the top GMs revive 'discredited' lines all the time

I wonder what Rybka says is best for black after 16. Rd1

You're right, but the same weaknesses exist in the modern lines after, say, 5.Nc3 Nf6 6.Ndb5 d6 7.Bf4 e5 8.Bg5 a6 9.Bxf6 gxf6 10.Na3 with an extra tempo.

(Side note: I thought one of Fischer's coolest opening ideas was the gambit from the Taimanov match, with the same opening moves as the Petrosian game through White's 8th move, then 8...Qa5+ 9.Qd2! Nxe4 10.Qxa5 Nxa5 11.Be3 (fourth move for the bishop) Kd7 12.N1c3! Nxc3 13.Nxc3 Kd8 14.Nb5!.)

More analysis needed! What do you all think?>

Robert Byrne covers this line in "Both Sides of the Chessboard". He says, "17.Qe3 does not work either: 17...Nd4 18.Kf1 Nxc2 19.Qd3 Rg4 20.Qxc2 Rxc4 21.dxe6 Qxc3 22.e7 Rxd1+ 23.Qxd1 Qh3+ 24.Ke1 Qd7 and wins."

He says that the critical move is 17.Ne4