|Mar-06-03|| ||kostich in time: Qb7!made the informants "most important innovations" list...it pretty much refutes Bb5.. |
|Apr-22-03|| ||ughaibu: There you have it, conclusive proof that Geller was still beating Fischer even after he'd degenerated into a legend. |
|May-23-03|| ||mrwonkabar: I count at least 3 positional pawn sacrifices by Geller in this game! |
|Jan-07-04|| ||Calli: 30.Qxe5?? is the loser. Moving the queen off the d-file allows the rook check at d8 and its all over. |
|Nov-08-06|| ||Stefan Teplan: @ughaibu
Geller first lost a game to Furman with the same variation and found 14...Qb7 only after Fischer's glorious victory over Spassky (who in the sixth game of the 1972-match just copied Geller's moves from 1970 and consequently lost). Had Geller played this variation vs. Fischer in 1972, I guess Fischer would have finished him even more convincingly as Furman did
|Nov-08-06|| ||ughaibu: The way I heard it, Geller had told Spassky about Qb7, but during the game Spassky forgot.|
|Nov-21-06|| ||Stefan Teplan: I did some more research on that issue. According to various sources Geller suggested to Spassky 16...Qb7 (after 14...a6 15. dxc5 bxc5 16. 0-0) but not 14...Qb7.
However, some chess authors claim that Spassky was not fond of that suggestion by Geller's and chose 16...Ra7 instead, deviating from the game Furman-Geller, 1970 only after 17. Be2 with ...Nd7. Let me quote from Eduard Gufeld's and Nikolai Kalienchenko's excellent book "Chess Strategy" (annotations after Spassky's 16...Ra7):
"In his notes to his games with Furman (see Informant No. 9) Geller suggested 16...Qb717. Ba4 (or 17. Be2 Nd7 =) 17...Qb6, but there was evidently soemthing Spassky disliked about this variation, whereas Fischer was only too eager to go into it. White could continue 18. Ne5, not letting the knight out, or Rc3 and 19. Rfc1. The line remained behind the scenes, and we will refrain from noting '16...Qb7 was better.' "|
|Jan-15-09|| ||Eyal: Interestingly, Timman analyzed the possibility of 14...Qb7 in his annotations to the Fischer-Spassky match (published before this game was played), and was of the opinion that White keeps an advantage after 15.dxc5 bxc5 16.Rxc5 Rxc5 17.Qxc5 a6 18.Bd3 Qxb2 19.0-0 Nd7 (19...Qxa2? 20.Nd4!) 20.Qc6 Rb8 21.Nd4 Qb6 22.Rc1. |
In fact, Black can equalize by 21...Ne5! (22.Qxa6 Rb6 leads to repetition - 23.Qa8+ Rb8 24.Qa6 etc.), but Geller found the even stronger 17...Na6!; In case of 18.Qc6, Black keeps an edge after 18...Qxc6 19.Bxc6 Rb8 and Rxb2, since 20.b3 loses to 20...Rc8, and with the pawn on b3 White cannot avoid losing material by 21.Ba4.
|Nov-27-09|| ||rigel1503: To me, Timman's problems stem from the pawn grab on c5 before he ensures the safety of his king. Instead of 15. dxc5, why not 15. O-O. I don't see the need for rushing dxc5. Eg: 15. O-O c4 16. Qd6 Nc6 17. Ne5 Nxe5 18. Qxe5 Qc7 19. f4 Qxe5 20. fxe5 leaves White dominant due to Black's bad bishop, wooden inflexible pawn centre and cramped position.|
|Oct-08-10|| ||sevenseaman: Outmaneuvered. Very subtle!|
|Nov-05-11|| ||DrMAL: <Eyal: Interestingly, Timman analyzed the possibility of 14...Qb7 in his annotations to the Fischer-Spassky match> Yes this is interesting indeed. Fact is, Spassky and Geller had prepared 14...Qb7 as played in this game, post by <Stefan Teplan> is simply incorrect. See Fischer vs Spassky, 1972 for remarks on this, Timman chose second of two options in preparation that Spassky ignored during that key WC game.|
|Nov-06-11|| ||JoergWalter: <Eyal: Interestingly, Timman analyzed the possibility of 14...Qb7 in his annotations to the Fischer-Spassky match (published before this game was played), and was of the opinion that White keeps an advantage after 15.dxc5 bxc5 16.Rxc5 Rxc5 17.Qxc5 a6 18.Bd3 Qxb2 19.0-0 Nd7 (19...Qxa2? 20.Nd4!) 20.Qc6 Rb8 21.Nd4 Qb6 22.Rc1.>|
Timman gives the above as Pachman's line concluding <should allow White to hope for at least a persistent edge>.
Timman cited 16....Qb7 <Geller's idea> (instead of 16....Ra7)in his analysis of Fischer-Spassky, game 6, 1972).
|Nov-06-11|| ||SimonWebbsTiger: @<Joerg> and <DrMal>|
Geller relates the theory in game no.45 of his book <the Application of Chess Theory>, not mentioned by <Stefan Teplan> in his post back in Nov-21-06.
Geller had titles for each game and this one was <Mines Always Explode>. He wrote:
<The note to white's 14th move describes the mine which was "laid" under the variation which occurred in the game. Unfortunately, it didn't explode in the World Championship Match, but it was not wasted. Sooner or later mines explode, and the more of them a player has in his arsenal, the better.>
So Spassky failed to play a strong Geller invention (14...Qb7) versus Fischer!
|Nov-06-11|| ||JoergWalter: According to GM Keene 14....Qb7 was discovered by the soviet analytical machine a year after this game|
Maybe we inquire with GM Keene?
|Nov-06-11|| ||AnalyzeThis: It's absurd on its face to believe that the Russians spent significant time preparing Spassky to face the Queen's Gambit from Fischer.|
|Nov-06-11|| ||JoergWalter: Spassky was a specialist in this variant and has not lost a game with it until that day. Fischer could assume him to play it. There was a brainstorming before Spassky's preparation and the leading soviet players had to give an assessment what would be best against Fischer etc.. I remember it was Korchnoi who advised to prepare for the case that Fischer opens with other moves than 1.e4.|
|Nov-06-11|| ||DrMAL: <SimonWebbsTiger> Thanx for reference, what Geller wrote shows what others have distorted. I have no idea why they would do so, I did not know of anything other than what I originally wrote about Spassky not playing what Geller showed him (14...Qb7) this was indeed big mystery in Soviet Union after game and Spassky was indeed scolded for not playing it. |
It is absurd to imagine NO preparation against 1.d4 move (or 1.c4 or transposition played) and QGD, being "queen of d4 defenses" was good choice for Spassky to play. I will make few more posts (other than Alatortsev and Botvinnik's 7.g4! that I started yesterday and posted earlier today) on other variations of QGD, starting with (maybe simplest) Lasker and ending with (maybe with most complicated, without going into Semi-Slav) Tartakower, hope it helps to better enjoy games, cheers.
|Nov-07-11|| ||SimonWebbsTiger: @<DrMal>
the story which seems to be emerging is that Geller suggested 16...Qb7 in his Informator 9 notes to the loss to Furman. All the authors and journalists at the time would know of that suggestion, however what they wouldn't know -- as later mentioned by Geller in his book of games -- is the variation had been strengthened by 14...Qb7, which Spassky didn't employ, to his surprise. He used the novelty versus Timman a year later.
As also speculated, Fischer had been playing the English before Reykjavik so it made sense to prepare the QGD because of 1. c4 e6 transpositions.
Fischer's capacity for theoretical study was well known even then. Gligoric went so far as to state Furman's 14.Bb5 was in his 1972 Informator notes to game 6 of the World Chp. match. I recall my old trainer describing how everyone was "terrified" of 14. Bb5 until Geller uncorked 14...Qb7 against Timman.
This is a reading which makes sense to me as it fits the facts I know of.
|Nov-07-11|| ||JoergWalter: <SimonWebbsTiger>
<This is a reading which makes sense to me as it fits the facts I know of.>
Yes, everything is pointing into your and <DrMal>'s direction.
Maybe careless annotators confused the issue just to have a "sensational" line.
|Nov-07-11|| ||DrMAL: <SimonWebbsTiger> Makes sense. Not interested in stories from others who had no clue, what they learned secondhand and repeated honorably (hence no interest in Keene's answer about hearsay from Timman either). It was policy in Soviet Union to keep chess knowledge closely guarded secret. Unless one was Soviet or close enough friend to be trusted by "crowd" (very close friend to several), there was no way of learning truth about this or much of anything else. I just posted what I was taught many years ago, thought it was now common knowledge. I was surprised to learn stories of anything different, especially irrational reactions, cheers.|
|Nov-08-11|| ||AnalyzeThis: DrMal, I've thought about it and changed my mind, largely on what Eduard Gufeld wrote. Evidently, Spassky knew about Qb7 but didn't like something about it, so opted for another plan. Thanks for the discussion.|
|Nov-08-11|| ||SimonWebbsTiger: @<AnalyzsThis>
Gufeld would be reliable here because he was Geller's trainer in the 70s.
|Jul-12-12|| ||JoergWalter: there is a new side to the story according to a link <Kinan> provided:|
(I = Averbakh)
<I only recall that I spoke mainly about the flaws in the theoretical preparation and as an example gave the opening of the sixth game, where Spassky could have played better. I remember the look of surprise on Geller’s face when I pointed out the improvement. The most interesting thing, though, was that a few months after our meeting Geller “caught out” the Dutchman Timman using the variation I’d recommended.>
|Sep-22-12|| ||csmath: Interesting as it was general knowledge that the novelty was ready for the 1972 match but it seems Averbach claims that Geller did not know that.|
One way or the other this defeat of Timman was logical given how tricky was the middlegame for white.