A great question, and I think the answer is in the history of their last few games. Their 1922 game in Hastings marked a turning point between the two (see Rubinstein vs Alekhine, 1922), where Rubinstein for whatever reason appeared to get his move order wrong and lost a game he should have won.

I theorize that Alekhine's powerful (one might almost say demonic) presence combined with Rubinstein's pathological shyness and his well documented problems, exerted a decisive influence after that time.

If you go to my collection of <Rubinstein plays Alekhine> (below), you'll see that apart from a short anomalous draw, Rubinstein played like a rabbit caught in the spotlight after the Hastings game.

Alekhine knew his man and perhaps the written contempt that he expressed toward him in later writings, purportedly on behalf of the Nazis, sprang from around this time. I imagine he exuded that confidence (or maybe a sense of sneering superiority) to Rubinstein who seemed to consistently play into Alekhine's expectations.

I'm sure there's a psychological term for this sort of dominance.

Almost as remarkable as the trap, later in this game Alekhine plays the inferior <26.Nxc6?>, apparently hoping as <Pawn and Two> mentions a couple of posts earlier, to finish the game off quickly when a queen move almost anywhere equates to an easy routine win.

So what happened, after <26.Nxc5 bxc6 27.Rxc6>:

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instead of defending the Knight and the f-pawn with <27...Rd7>, he plays the fatal <27...Ne4> immediately returning the win to Alekhine that he had almost let slip, restoring the status quo. Superficially, the two positions are similar with White having four pawns for the piece, but after <27...Rd7>, Black's pieces are well placed and active.

The remaining moves by Rubinstein are extremely lackadaisical, like he's just going through the motions.

Thanks. I was definitely theorizing about this, but I still see it as a possiblity. Having said that, I feel on firmer ground about the psychological dominance Alekhine exercised over Rubinstein during their last five or six games.

This game is Rubinstein sleepwalking into disaster. Why on earth would a player of any knowledgeable caliber play <11...Ne4>, simply giving away a pawn without compensation? Let alone engage in the extraordinarily weak and I daresay pliant play Rubinstein displayed in the latter stages of this game?

Maybe there's a distinction to be made between Alekhine the man and the chess player across the board on the one hand, and Alekhine the chess analyst and author on the other. Perhaps reminiscent of later decades when we contrast Fischer the snarling anti-Semite and general all round oddball with Fischer the brutally honest chess player and analyst seeking absolute truth on the chess board.

While Alekhine may have written some complimentary things about Rubinstein's play at some points, this doesn't discount him possibly bullying or having an arrogant attitude towards Rubinstein during their actual match play.

There are many anecdotes about Alekhine that have made the rounds. Whether all of them are true or not is hard to say. Alekhine was a tremendous chess player, and at times, so far ahead of his peers, that his ego could have been somewhat overbearing. This sort of behaviour on his part often led to others creating negative portrayals of him, and in fact, exaggerating or fabricating stories about him. Chess players tend to be overly dramatic, for one reason or another.

An anecdote about Alekhine's bullying of Rubinstein sticks out in my mind, but I cannot recall who wrote it (perhaps William Winter in "Kings of Chess"? Or maybe a book published by Murray? I can't recall off the top of my head.)

Apparently, at some tournament, Alekhine and Bogolyubov, on a drunken lark, went to Rubinstein's hotel room and banged on the door shouting that they were the police, and for him to open the door. Rubinstein apparently fled the hotel and the tournament.

I can't say I know anything about this incident. Maybe someone else might know? These pages are wonderful; sometimes you get responses years later...

Analysis by Fritz shows the following:

(.33) (25 ply) 28.Qf3 f4 29.R1c5 fxe3 30.fxe3 a5, (.07) (21 ply) 31.Rd5 Nf7 32.Rcc5 Rxd5 33.Rxd5 Qc7 34.Rc5 Qe7, or (.07) (21 ply) 31.Ra6 Rf8 32.Qg3 Re8 33.Qxg5 Qxg5 34.Rxg5 Nc4.

Or (.21) (25 ply) 28.Rxa6 f4, (.35) (25 ply) 29.exf4 Ne4 30.Qb5 Rde7 31.Qb6 Qxb6 32.Rxb6 Nd2 33.f3 gxf4 34.Rf6, (.46) (23 ply) 34...Re1+ 35.Rxe1 Rxe1+ 36.Kf2 Rb1 37.b3 Rb2 38.Rxf4 Rxa2, (.33) (24 ply) 39.Ke3 Nxb3 40.Rg4 Rd2 41.h4 Rd1 42.h5 Na5 43.Ke2 Rb1 44.Rg5 Nc6 45.d5, (.10) (24 ply) 45...Nd4+ 46.Kd3 Nb5 47.g4 Nd6.

Improvements can probably be found in these variations, but Black certainly appears to have good drawing chances.

<Penguin> Try this classic example of pawn power: it also comes down to five pawns for a Rook, with the unique matching of Rppp-vs-pppppppp.

Alekhine cites a passage from <Reti's> "Masters of the Chess Board" in his annotations of this game.

In "Masters of the Chess Board" <Reti> writes:

<"Most chess players in a poor position make the mistake of <<<attacking impetuously>>>, at all costs, and without any regard for the positional requirements of the situation. The usual result is they lose still more quickly... Accordingly, the psychologically correct procedure for a player... in a bad position is as follows: he must strengthen... strong points and lines to which he is positionally entitled to lay claim, so that his opponent... finds real obstacles in his path which cannot be easily overcome.">

From this position, White to move, Alekhine gives these notes:

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<"It is clear at first sight, that theoretically speaking, White has a won game, but... In another way, which could be said to be against Reti's <<<"prescription">>> for the player in an inferior position, I decided to oppose his method by a system also based on psychological considerations... >

[Alekhine means he will launch a vigorous attack instead of positionally consolidate]

Then again:

<International Master Bernard Zuckerman points out the answer is to be found in Alexander Alekhine’s annotations to the following game [Alekhine - Tylor, Margate 1937] , number 91 in My Best Games of Chess 1924–1937.

[...]

An exaggerated faith in the knowledge of my opponents was always the vulnerable point of my opening play: for instance, at San Remo, 1930, I did not take a pawn on the tenth [sic] move which my opponent, Rubinstein, left en prise in an even more obvious way than in this game!>