For example, he left out the fact that there were only two original moves in the game, and that it had followed this game for the first 12 moves:

Keres vs Gurgenidze, 1959

Keres varied on the spot with 13. Qb4, which, though not obvious at first, was a bad move.

Fischer left out the fact that Keres had initially refused the draw offer and forced Black to make a move first (Black had offered the draw while he was on the move). If Keres had known how much trouble he was in, he'd have just taken the draw when offered. By the time Black found 14...a5, both players knew White was in trouble, but the draw offer was already on the table and couldn't be retracted.

Obviously if the game had been pre-arranged, Black wouldn't have played the strongest move in that position. Play anything else and the final position is more equal.

In trying to tell us that Petrosian was too loyal to Keres to win a won game against him, Fischer left out the fact that 3 rounds later, Petrosian was offering to help Benko analyze the adjourned Benko-Keres game. So much for any great loyalty.

Of course Fischer's claim of a Mate in 5 if White played 15. Qa3 was completely imaginary. I think Timman tried to rationalize this by saying that there was a possible Mate in 5, but not a forced one, which would be really disingenuous if he'd said that. If you want to make excuses for Fischer here, it would be kinder to assume that somebody at Sports Illustrated misunderstood what he said.

You have to wonder how many people spent hours looking at that diagram looking for the Mate in 5 that was supposedly too obvious to need pointing, and failing to find it. I wonder if they ever printed a retraction? I've got the issue in question, but I don't have the next few issues after that.

Well of course. The Russians weren't worried about Benko. He wasn't going anywhere. Why not help Benko if it means <you> might get a shot at the world championship.

<Petrosianic: Fischer left out the fact that Keres had initially refused the draw offer and forced Black to make a move first (Black had offered the draw while he was on the move). If Keres had known how much trouble he was in, he'd have just taken the draw when offered. By the time Black found 14...a5, both players knew White was in trouble, but the draw offer was already on the table and couldn't be retracted. >

That's not a big deal. Keres was just saying, follow the standard protocol in making your draw offer.

<Of course Fischer's claim of a Mate in 5 if White played 15. Qa3 was completely imaginary. I think Timman tried to rationalize this by saying that there was a possible Mate in 5, but not a forced one, which would be really disingenuous if he'd said that. >

I agree, there's some bad analysis. But it's sufficient to say that black took a draw in a position with a clear advantage for himself.

Someone else said on these pages that we are not trying to establish a mathematical proof, we are trying to establish innocence or guilt as in a court of law.

In a court of law, if you have such strong circumstantial evidence of collusion (as the games themselves), AND the testimony of THREE people who were insiders during the whole situation and very close to the protagonists, you would have only one verdict: GUILTY AS CHARGED

<This, by the way, is the answer to the trivia question that I tossed out a few days ago. Which Soviet player once motioned for Fischer to be added to a Candidates series that he hadn't qualified for?

It was Bronstein. After Bronstein qualified but was excluded from the 1965 Candidates, he petitioned FIDE to expand the Candidates from 8 to 16, and include himself, Fischer and Stein, among others. They turned it down and stuck with 8.>

Very interesting, thanks. My guesses were way off.

I think Bronstein mentioned that in <The Sorcerer's Apprentice>. The "rationale" was that Botvinnik would face fewer of the toughest players that way. I don't know if the story is true or not.

I do not think that the Russians were lying. Fischer's complaint was legitimate but that does not explain his poor results, as Karpov says, people do not win tournaments by drawing. I think Fischer was simply not in the same class as the top trio. Here are the results:

Petrosian 2.5 - 1.5 Fischer
Geller 2.5 - 1.5 Fischer
Keres 2.0 - 2.0 Fischer

For somebody who claimed that he was the true challenger and the best player around that was poor. Also I would not count Tal (during that period) or Filip (Fischer scored 3 of his 8 wins against these two) among "the world's best". It was a shame that the number of Soviet players was restricted just imagine the tournament with Spassky instead of Filip!

Fischer lost 7 games in this tournament. How many lost positions did he get into but manage to save?

At least three: the game with Benko, the second cycle game with Korchnoi, and the 4th cycle game with Geller.

Nothing else leaps immediately to mind (his 4th cycle games with Keres and Petrosian were very difficult, but I'm not sure if he was provably lost in either one). Even so, 10 lost positions in 27 rounds is an awful lot to base an "I shoulda won" campaign around. Anybody who finds that performance comparable to Fischer 1972 isn't looking very hard.

But of course there is a big, big difference between being worse at some stage and losing. Fischer in 1972 was very hard to put away.

I don't think there was anything accidental about it. He couldn't find anything, and so allowed a repetition rather than lower himself to offer a draw.

There were several creative drawing methods in that match. Which was the game (Game 20? maybe) where Fischer asked the referee to check for repetition (in a position where there clearly was none), and while he was doing that, Spassky signed the scoresheets?

Alexander Koblents >

"The Fabulous 70s: 3 Chess People and a Beautiful Woman … Plus, Petrosian Tidbits"

http://nezhmet.wordpress.com/2008/0...